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BOOK REVIEWS

Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, by Charles Griswold. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. xxxvi + 242. ISBN 978-0-521-87882-1
(hardback), ISBN 978-0-521-70351-2 (paperback). $83.99 (hardback),
$21.99(paperback).
I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies, by Nick Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. xi + 298. ISBN 978-0-521-86552-4 (hardback), ISBN 978-0-521-68423-1 (paperback). $99.00 (hardback), $24.99
(paperback).
ROBERT C. ROBERTS, Baylor University
Both Griswold and Smith acknowledge that the concept respectively
under examination is not susceptible of strict philosophical definition,
though both philosophers specify a paradigm type of case, from which
less paradigmatic cases deviate in various ways and with reference to
which the less paradigmatic cases can be conceptually clarified. The books
are also structurally similar. Griswold devotes the first two thirds of his
book to analyzing individual-to-individual forgiveness, and the last third
to political apology, an action analogous to asking for forgiveness, and
acceptance of such apology, which is analogous to forgiving; while Smith
devotes the first three-fifths of his book to individuals’ apologies, and the
last two-fifths to collective apologies. Each author takes the political kind
of case to be much more complicated and ethically problematic, as well as
conceptually murkier, than the individual kind. With one notable exception, both books illustrate their points with abundant, excellent examples,
both historical and (especially in Smith’s case) imagined. I will start with
an evaluation of Griswold’s book.
The first chapter divides into two historical discussions, the first of forgiveness in the ancient world, and the second of Joseph Butler’s account of
forgiveness in two of his Fifteen Sermons. Griswold disagrees with Hannah
Arendt’s claim that “the discoverer of the role of forgiveness in the realm
of human affairs was Jesus of Nazareth.” He claims that ancient pagan
conceptions of forgiveness existed, but offers no examples and spends
most of the discussion of forgiveness in the ancient world showing that
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the philosophers, notably Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, did not regard
forgiveness as a good thing. The explanation is that they were all “perfectionists” who therefore held nothing less than perfection to be really good.
Forgiveness is a response to injury, and the perfected person cannot be, or
almost cannot be, injured, nor does he injure; so the best human life offers
no occasion for forgiveness. Furthermore, forgiveness, as distinguished
from excuse or equitable clemency, would seem to be a compromise of
strict justice; and justice certainly is a good thing. Given Griswold’s care
in distinguishing forgiving from such neighboring concepts as excusing,
condoning, pardoning, showing mercy, and compassion, when he claims
that forgiveness is a notion current in ancient paganism, he must be using
the word carefully. It would have been helpful to have some examples.
The second chapter, “Forgiveness at Its Best,” expounds what Griswold
takes to be forgiveness in the paradigm case. He has told us, in chapter 1,
that he is going to treat forgiveness as a virtue, and that he means “virtue”
to have the sense it has in Aristotle. This would seem to suggest that he is
going to treat forgiveness as a personal trait, and he comments that a more
precise term for the trait would be “forgivingness,” where forgiveness “is
what a forgiving person’s virtue of forgivingness gives rise to” (p. 17; see
also pp. 72, 92, 130).
The distinction between forgiveness as a process, transaction, exchange,
or action, on the one hand, and forgivingness as a virtue on the other,
seems to me a useful one that might even enter into the resolution of some
of the puzzles that arise in connection with forgiveness. Griswold briefly
discusses this distinction, saying, “the admirable trait of being disposed
to forgiveness (in the right way, on the right occasion, and such, as determined by practical reason)—the quality predicated of a forgiving person’s
character—is ‘forgivingness,’ on analogy, say, with ‘courageousness’”
(ibid.). The analogy seems odd, since not “courageousness,” but “courage,” is the usual word for the trait. And while there is a verb “to forgive”
to go with the adjective “forgiving” and the trait name “forgivingness,”
there is no verb “to cour” to go with the adjective “courageous” and the
trait name “courage.” To get a verb, one needs a phrase formed from the
adjective or the noun, such as “act courageously” or “perform an act of
courage.” In the case of courage, then, the virtue seems to have linguistic
primacy, while in the case of forgiveness, the action, process, response,
exchange, attitude, or whatever forgiveness is, gets linguistic priority, and
for the virtue one needs some such expression as “being a forgiving person” or the rather quaint “forgivingness.” I should think that nobody in
modern English thinks that “forgiveness” names a virtue—which is not to
deny that many people think forgiveness virtuous.
An instructive analogy is Aristotle’s comment on friendship at the beginning of NE book 8. In the second sentence he says, “For friendship is a
virtue,” and then qualifies himself, “or like a virtue” (met’ aretês). Friendship is not really a virtue, Aristotle seems to be saying, not a trait that
an individual may have, but a kind of ongoing relationship between two
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persons that requires virtues. In resemblance to virtues, forgiveness can
perhaps be a state of a person—the state of having forgiven an offender,
or of having been forgiven by one’s victim. But forgiveness as a state is a
state of relationship between one person and another, and not a trait of
individual character. As a necessarily dispositional relationship, friendship is more like a virtue than is what we often call forgiveness, which has
more the character of a process or event or action or transaction. Griswold
himself attests to this fact, for despite saying that he is expounding forgiveness as a virtue (pp. 17, 31, 47, 49, 130), he characterizes it variously
as an ethical response (p. 39), a process (pp. 48, 98, 212), an act or action
(p. 50), an exchange (p. 53n12), a communicative or bilateral act (p. 64), a
“reciprocal moral exchange” (p. 127), and a “dyadic exchange” (p. 140).
When he calls it the “end result” [of a process] (p. 98), something that can
be perfectly (or imperfectly) “accomplished” (pp. 113–117), he seems to be
classifying it as what I above called a “state.” In this last case, the half of
the state on the victim’s side would be the victim’s dispositional attitude
toward the wrongdoer and will be more closely analogous to friendship
and virtue. But it still wouldn’t be the trait of being (more generally) a
forgiving person. Below I will propose that forgiveness is, most basically,
such an attitude.
I think we see two strands in Griswold’s discussion of forgiveness as a
“virtue,” which sit uneasily together: on the one hand, he acknowledges
the difference between forgivingness as a virtue and forgiveness as a possible exemplification of the virtue in an act or process of forgiving, but he
hardly discusses forgivingness as a trait; instead, on the other hand, the
first two-thirds of his book is about a transaction or moral exchange that
he calls forgiveness, but he persists in calling it a virtue. One suspects that
in the latter kind of case, “virtue” does not have the sense of excellent
personal trait, as in Aristotle, but simply means something morally good.
That is what the ancient philosophers denied, and what Griswold affirms.
“Forgiveness at Its Best,” then, is about the structure of a paradigm
case of the moral transaction that Griswold calls forgiveness. “. . . forgiveness is fundamentally an interpersonal process whose success requires
actions from both parties” (p. 212). Forgiveness is not a “gift” that a victim
of moral injury bestows on the perpetrator of the injury, but a transaction
or exchange between the two persons requiring each of them to fulfill
certain conditions.
The core of Griswold’s presentation of the “virtue” of forgiveness is
the specification of thirteen conditions that must be met in the paradigm
case. Forgiveness is a two-party transaction, and each of the parties must
meet six conditions. The thirteenth condition is that the offense must be
forgivable.
Conditions the offender must meet are:
Take responsibility for the wrong
Repudiate her action as wrong
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Experience and express regret for the action
Commit herself to “becoming the sort of person who does not inflict injury”
and show this commitment in deeds as well as words
Show that she understands, from the victim’s perspective, the damage she
has done
Present a narrative of the wrong, of herself as agent of the wrong, and of her
resolve to change, that shows the victim a way of reframing her that warrants his granting her forgiveness (pp. 49–51)

Conditions the victim must meet are:
Forswear revenge
Moderate his resentment
Commit to letting the resentment go altogether
Change his belief that the wrongdoer is simply a “bad person”
Drop any presumption of his moral superiority to the wrong-doer, or that
his own identity is defined as someone injured by the wrong-doer
Address the wrongdoer and declare that he grants her forgiveness (pp. 54–58)

It seems to me that Griswold’s analysis of forgiveness would be improved by some clear and systematic distinctions between and among (1)
forgiveness as an act and (2) as a state (on the part of the offender, forgiveness as a state is the state of being forgiven, which is not a psychological state; on the part of the victim, forgiveness as a state is psychological,
namely an attitude toward the offender), (3) the ideal dyadic exchange
between victim and offender, which we might call the repentanceforgiveness exchange, (4) forgivingness as the trait of character that disposes its possessor to forgiveness as an act or state, and (5) forgiveness as
a cultural institution.
Following these distinctions, forgiveness itself (as we might call it)
would be roughly captured by the conditions that Griswold says the vic
tim must meet. The victim is the one who “does” the forgiving (just as,
alternatively, he might be the one who excuses, condones, takes revenge,
feeds on his resentment, or demonizes his offender). By no stretch of English is what the offender contributes to the interaction forgiveness. In the
ideal dyadic exchange, the offender contributes repentance. So forgiveness is clearly distinct from the ideal dyadic transaction that consists of
the interaction of the offender’s contrition with the victim’s forgiveness.
Forgiveness “itself” (as we might say) is most fundamentally an attitude
of a victim toward the offender, in light of the offense. The attitude is benevolent rather than vengeful towards the offender, despite clear recognition of the negative moral status of the offense. Thus it is an attitude that
presupposes an appreciation of the moral wrongness of the offense. (One
can be a forgiver only if one has a sense of justice.)
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Forgiveness as an attitude is distinct from forgiveness as an act of communicating one’s attitude to the offender. Often, forgiveness as an attitude
precedes the victim’s act of communicating his attitude to the offender—
of “offering” or explicitly conferring forgiveness. In other cases, the act
of conferring forgiveness is an important part of the process of moving
towards a forgiving attitude.
On p. 64 Griswold criticizes unconditional forgiveness, saying, “as a
communicative or bilateral act, ‘forgiveness’ that requires nothing of the
offender . . . does communicate to her, as well as to everyone else, that she
is not being held accountable.” But if we distinguish between forgiveness
as an attitude and the act of communicating that attitude to the offender,
then it would not follow that forgiveness communicates anything at all.
One might forgive and remain completely silent about it, if that seemed
the wise course. And perhaps it would be the wise course, in case the offender would take the communication as condoning her delinquency. But,
contrary to Griswold’s claim, that is not the only kind of case. Sometimes
a pre-emptive communication of forgiveness (either in explicit words, or
in demeanor) elicits repentance. To me it makes more sense to talk of actions or attitudes of the offender as conditions warranting the communi
cation of forgiveness, rather than as warranting forgiveness itself. And
such warrants are not universally required, but required in only some of
the cases, as practical wisdom must be left to adjudicate. (Forgiveness as
communication of forgiveness is one sense of “act of forgiveness”; another
is forgiveness as the resolution or effort or undertaking to take, or begin to
take, a forgiving attitude.)
One factor influencing the offender’s construal of the victim’s communication of forgiveness is the offender’s knowledge or sense of the victim’s moral character. If the victim has the virtue of forgivingness, then
the offender’s knowledge may include that the victim is nobody’s fool or
doormat, that she has strong self-respect, a strong sense of justice, and is
likely to appreciate better than the offender the moral significance of the
offender’s offense. (Without a strong sense of justice, a person does not
have the virtue of forgivingness; that is what keeps her from being a condoner.) Here we see the relevance of the definite concept of virtue, and of
forgivingness in particular, to the ideal dyadic exchange.
Thus, I would distinguish the victim’s forgiveness of the offender from
the victim’s character trait of readiness or disposition to forgive offenders. Forgivingness is an affective/cognitive constitution of personality or
character trait that amounts to a readiness or disposition and capacity to
forgive. Perhaps paradigmatically, but not necessarily, forgiveness would
be a response to the offender’s meeting some or all of the conditions that
Griswold requires of her. The conditions that Griswold thinks the offender must satisfy are some of the points of sensitivity of the forgiving person;
they are the kinds of considerations that a forgiving person finds especially compelling. Forgivingness will involve a set of deeply appropriated
moral and/or theological concepts and a set of collateral virtues (justice,
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humility, compassion, generosity, self-control, practical wisdom). It will
be the result of moral education within a worldview. Griswold points out
that forgiveness belongs in moral outlooks that acknowledge the ongoing
imperfection of human beings in a world fraught with injustices (p. 113),
and that Christianity is one such outlook. He points out the lack of fit
between forgiveness and most if not all of the moral outlooks represented by the ancient philosophers. Griswold explicitly eschews discussion
of theological matters, but looking at the more particular ways in which
people belonging to a moral outlook understand themselves, their human
fellows, and the nature of the universe (including a conception of God, if
any) would be required for a fine-grained understanding of the virtue of
forgivingness. The cognitive-affective structure of virtues will vary with
such world-view differences.
We could also helpfully distinguish an institution or practice of forgiveness, which would be something like Griswold’s paradigm scenario
functioning as a set of guidelines governing procedure in cases of interpersonal moral injury, but would also include the moral and religious
beliefs that make sense of the procedure. Christians have a theology of
forgiveness, including such doctrines as the fallenness of human nature,
the love and forgiving nature of God as well as his capacity for wrath, the
redeeming power of the cross of Christ, and the commandment that we
should forgive one another as God has forgiven us. A secular philosophy
of forgiveness will include a doctrine of morally flawed human nature,
and perhaps a utilitarian justification for the practice, in light of flawed
human nature and the devastating consequences typical of unmitigated
anger and cycles of revenge.
The notion of forgiveness as an institution could help with deciding
whether forgiveness existed in ancient paganism. We might allow that
Achilles’ compassionate relaxation of his anger at the house of Priam and
his granting of Priam’s wish to give his son Hector a fitting funeral (Ili
ad 24) is an instance of ancient pagan forgiveness (Griswold says it isn’t,
77), while holding that the institution of forgiveness arose first with the
teaching and life of Jesus of Nazareth. Even in the Old Testament, the few
instances of inter-human forgiveness (Esau of Jacob [Genesis 33], Joseph
of his brothers [Genesis 45]) are far less in doubt than that there was an
institution of inter-human forgiveness. The ancient Hebrew world-view
was hospitable to a concept of forgiveness in ways that Greek philosophy
was not; but conceptual readiness for a practice is not the same as actually
having it.
Forgiveness as an attitude excludes anger and resentment towards the
offender, but I don’t think it is necessary that there be a stage at which the
victim felt anger or resentment, and then another stage at which he overcame it or got over it. This may be the typical scenario, but it is not the only
one, and the forgiveness may be all the more impressive morally if the
victim does not get angry at the offense. When the boy Ilyusha unjustly
bites Alyosha Karamazov’s finger to the bone, Alyosha does not react in
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anger, but in compassion for the boy, whom he supposes to be suffering
in some way unknown to Alyosha. We are justified in thinking Alyosha
forgives Ilyusha, rather than condones or excuses, because we know he
recognizes that he has been injured, appreciates the moral gravity of the
injury, and yet is not vindictive but benevolent toward the malefactor.
And part of our reason for thinking so is our knowledge of his character.
By this time in the story we know Alyosha well enough to read the scenario as depicting a forgiving attitude rather than abject condoning or exculpatory excusing. He does not undergo a process of forgiveness, and he
does not perform an act of forgiveness, either of declaring his forgiveness
of Ilyusha or of actively renouncing anger and revenge; but he does take a
forgiving attitude toward the boy.
Griswold’s third chapter, entitled “Imperfect Forgiveness,” is devoted
to cases in which the interpersonal exchange that Griswold calls forgiveness fails to meet some of the thirteen conditions. The main deviant types
are third-party forgiveness, unilateral forgiveness, and self-forgiveness. I
will comment on the first two of these.
In third-party forgiveness, someone other than the victim forgives the
offender, thus violating an apparent rule that only the victim has standing
to forgive. Although Griswold does not make standing a distinct condition for the victim to forgive the offender, the condition seems implicit in
his status as victim and the justness of his resentment. The need to make
room for third-party forgiveness arises from cases in which the offender
has fulfilled all the repentance-conditions, but the victim has died without forgiving, or simply refuses to forgive. On a Christian understanding,
the counterintuitiveness of this situation is considerably mitigated by the
fact that God, as the primary victim in every case, always has standing to
forgive (though it is still sad not to have been forgiven by one’s human
victim, if one is deeply repentant). Griswold’s secular solution is to give
a kind of secondary standing to a third party who is justifiably indignant
about the wrong and sufficiently identified with the victim through caring for her and knowing her, as well as knowing about the offender’s offense and repentance (p. 119). But to legitimate his standing in as proxyforgiver, the third party must have some historical justification for thinking that, under different circumstances, the victim would have been willing to grant forgiveness.
I think we can see how a clear conception of forgivingness, as distinct
from forgiving, is also relevant to third-party “forgiveness.” Even if the
third party is not qualified to forgive the offense in the sense of conferring or pronouncing forgiveness, as a forgiving person he will still have
an attitude towards the offender, in light of the offense, that has much in
common with forgiveness. He will value and sympathetically understand
the offender’s repentance and desire for forgiveness; he will appreciate his
own moral fallibility in matters like that of the offense. His own indignation at the offender will be mitigated by compassion, and by the offender’s repentance. This compassionate moral understanding by an involved
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third party can have much the same effect on the offender’s conscience as
forgiveness proper might have.
By now it should be clear that I do not think that unilateral forgiveness
is necessarily an imperfect kind of forgiveness. If we distinguish forgiveness from repentance, and from the ideal dyadic transaction of which forgiveness is one side, then forgiveness can be complete as forgiveness without the repentance of the offender, though of course in that case it has not
been properly received by the offender, and has not been “completed” in the
restoration of mutual good will, which I suppose to be the ultimate telos
of forgiveness.
In the last third of his book, Griswold argues that forgiveness as he has
expounded it is not applicable in political contexts, though there is place
for a related transaction, that of political apology and its acceptance by
the injured entity. Governments and other institutions apologize but do
not properly ask forgiveness, and accept apologies but do not forgive. Political apology resembles the repentance-forgiveness exchange in supposing that a wrong has been done by some identifiable agent who can take
responsibility for it and is not asking for mercy or clemency or that the
wrong be forgotten, and that the success of the apology depends on truthfully stating the facts of the wrong. Still, political apology is not a request
for forgiveness, and the acceptance of such apology is not forgiveness, for
several reasons: (1) There are too many players, with too diverse agendas and points of view, on both sides of the interaction; the forgiveness
exchange requires integrated personal agents on both sides. (2) This complexity makes it difficult and urgent to control the possible consequences
of apologies, of which there are many such as legal liability and loss or
gain of power, and which are not characteristic factors in cases of repentance and forgiveness. (3) Political apologies are delivered and accepted
by representatives rather than by the actual wrongdoer and the actual victim, and thus bear a resemblance to third-party forgiveness transactions
and have a symbolic character absent from forgiveness exchanges. (4) No
particular sentiments analogous to contrition and resentment are required
for successful political apologies.
Griswold usefully discusses several historical examples of public apology, including the University of Alabama’s apology to the descendents
of American slaves for the university’s prospering from slavery, the U.S.
Government’s apology to Japanese Americans for interning them during
WW II, Desmond Tutu’s pronouncing forgiveness on the South African
Dutch Reformed Church in response to a repentant plea by its representative for its complicity in apartheid, and King Hussein’s apology to the parents of some Israeli girls murdered by a berserk Jordanian soldier. He also
looks at two cases of culpable failure to apologize: Robert McNamara’s
for the mishandling of the Viet Nam War, and Richard Nixon’s for the
Watergate cover-up.
The last substantive chapter in the book is a meditation on the Vietnam War Memorial on the Mall in Washington, D.C. Griswold admires
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the Memorial as architecturally brilliant but faults it morally, because it
avoids the honest recognition of the injustice of the war that a public apology would have embodied. Instead, the Memorial invites reflection about
the justice of the war, while honoring the courage of those who fought in
it. Griswold detects in this evaluative compromise an untenable effort to
separate the virtues. “Courage in the service of wrong is not a virtue, and
thus no longer courage proper . . . . Would one call a child molester ‘courageous’ in light of his persisting in his activities at great personal risk?”
(p. 208). An implication of Griswold’s position here would seem to be that
no acts of courage can have been performed in the course of the Viet Nam
War. This seems to me an intolerable implication that casts doubt on Griswold’s way of conceiving the inseparability of the virtues. At a minimum
we should distinguish courageous but unjust actions performed by persons who are aware of the injustice they are doing from ones who believe
their actions to be just. But I am inclined to think that even actions performed by people who know them to be unjust may satisfy the conditions
for being courageous. Courage need not be conceived as a “moral” virtue
in the same way that justice and compassion are.
Nick Smith is a legal theorist, and his present book is a prolegomenon
to a projected volume on apologies in the law. He writes in a lively fashion
with engaging and sometimes amusing examples that compensate somewhat for his long wind and repetitions. He tries to maintain a healthy
balance between, on the one hand, individual responsibility for wrongdoing and the importance of authentic contrition in apologizing and, on the
other, the effect of institutional structures and the importance of pragmatic considerations in the pursuit of public wellbeing. In this I think he
succeeds. He has a cursory chapter on the relation of apologies to forgiveness, but forgiveness is not a major concern of the book. He does not, to
my memory, use the word “virtue.”
To Griswold’s paradigm of forgiveness corresponds Smith’s categorical apology, thus the most thoroughly and purely apologetic kind of apology, “the most robust, painstaking, and formal of the varieties” (p. 140).
Smithian categorical apology is unlike Griswoldian forgiveness in not being an exchange or transaction between offender and victim, but belongs
decisively on the side of the offender; it is a “gesture” (p. 24) or a “ritual”
(p. 26), perhaps a performance, directed at the victim. The categorical
apology has the following twelve properties: The offender (1) states and
corroborates the facts of the delinquency in question, rather than vaguely
characterizing them (“I was wrong”); (2) declares that he is causally responsible for the offense and to be blamed for it (not just expressing regret
at the offense or sympathy with the victim); (3) has standing to apologize
for the harm; (4) distinguishes and identifies clearly each of the harms
for which he is blameworthy (not, for example, apologizing merely for
one of the minor harms he caused); (5) identifies the moral principles that
his delinquency violates; (6) endorses those principles, presumably in
agreement with the victim; (7) acknowledges the victim’s status as moral
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interlocutor with full human agency and dignity; (8) regrets his action or
inaction “categorically,” that is, not merely as a bad consequence of an
appropriate action (“I am sorry that I dropped an atomic bomb on your
country but it was the best available option”), but as an action that he
now thoroughly repudiates; (9) articulates (communicates) 1–2, 4–8 to the
victim; 10) reforms his life so as not to offend again in the way apologized
for, again and again demonstrates his commitment to reform, accepts appropriate sanctions for his wrongdoing, and redresses the injury as far as
he reasonably can; (11) intends his apology to serve not merely his own
interests, but the wellbeing of the victim and the vindication of relevant
values; (12) feels appropriate emotions, for example, guilt about his delinquency and sympathy for the victim.
Much of the burden of Smith’s book is to show how far many (most)
apologies fall short of being real apologies, by apologizing vaguely or
about the wrong wrong, by not really taking responsibility, by expressing only sympathy or conditional regret, by only expressing agreement
on the moral principles involved, or by not really intending to act differently in the future. Apologies are often deceitful, being efforts to convey
“meaning” they do not actually have so as to avoid responsibility or the
consequences of irresponsible behavior. Smith’s book aims to make this
eventuality less likely in the reader’s case. Among non-categorical kinds
of apologies, Smith discusses the Ambiguous Apology, Expression of
Sympathy, the Value-Declaring Apology, the Conciliatory Apology, the
Compensatory Apology, the Purely Instrumental Apology, the Coerced
Apology, and the Proxy Apology.

Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives, by Kevin Timpe. London: Continuum, 2008. Pp. 155. $130.00 (hardcover).
NEAL A. TOGNAZZINI, The College of William and Mary
The problem of free will is one of those philosophical problems—perhaps
they are all like this—that rewards those who take the time to revisit the
basics. It is for this reason that I am always glad to see books like Kevin
Timpe’s Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives, which for the most part endeavors to furnish the last fifty years of debate over free will with a new and
useful perspective. Timpe thus adds his own voice to the mix not only by arguing for a particular view about free will but also by simply telling its story.
Timpe’s book is very readable and he displays an impressive command
of what has become an almost unmanageably large literature. Indeed,
Timpe tells his story so that, for the most part, readers need not have any
background in free will (though I would wager that newcomers to the issues will nevertheless occasionally get lost in the intricate thicket that the
Frankfurt-style counterexamples have become). The book’s conclusion is

